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Stein  Rokkan’s  comparative  historical  account  of  party  system formation  in  Western  Europe  has 
proved enormously influential due to the appeal of tying individual political behaviour to large-scale 
historical transformations. This article reviews the literature that has studied the genesis of cleavage-
based party systems, as well as theoretical and empirical assessments of the degree to which they have 
remained stable or “frozen”. If it is adapted to allow for a more dynamic perspective, the cleavage 
approach also helps us to make sense of recent transformations of Western European party systems by 
pointing to new “critical junctures” that are likely to have a lasting impact on party competition and on 
individual political behaviour. In the second part of this review, I discuss applications of the approach 
outside Western Europe, focusing above all on Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. If it is 
modified according to the specific historical trajectories of these countries, the cleavage concept helps 
us understand both how party systems become institutionalized in new democracies, as well as the type 
of conflicts they are likely to reflect.  Furthermore, criticisms of social structural determinism have 
resulted in a new generation of scholarship that insists on paying more attention to the interplay of 
structure and agency in forging long-term bonds between parties and voters. 
Introduction
The “Rokkanian” concept of cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 
Rokkan  1970,  Rokkan  1999)  has  for  a  long time  occupied  a 
central role in the literature on the formation of European party 
systems and in studies of contemporary voting behaviour.1 More 
recently,  it  has  also  been  used  in  accounts  of  party  system 
formation in new democracies. The term “cleavage”  denotes a 
specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in 
the social structural transformations that have been triggered by 
large-scale processes such as nation building, industrialization, 
and possibly also by the consequences of post-industrialization. 
One of the great appeals of the concept thus lies in its ability to 
link individual political behaviour to macro-historical processes, 
and to  make sense of the way “critical  junctures” may shape 
politics in path-dependent ways for decades. In a perspective of 
comparative  methodology,  the  cleavage  approach  helps  us  to 
understand the origins  of similarities  and differences between 
party systems and countries. 
In this review, I will be concerned primarily with the literature 
that seeks to explain the genesis and the subsequent evolution of 
party systems from a cleavage perspective. The recent themes 
addressed in this strand of research are the question to which 
degree historical conflicts are still of relevance for party politics 
today, and whether the new political conflicts that have emerged 
in advanced industrial countries since the 1960s can be expected 
to acquire the same stability as the traditional cleavages related 
to class and religion. I also discuss how the cleavage concept has 
been applied to the study of party politics in new democracies. 
In  its  original  formulation,  the  concept  is  tightly  interwoven 
with  the  Western  European  historical  path  to  nation-state 
formation and industrialization, precluding its direct application 
to  other  contexts.  However,  since  the  central  hunch of  the 
1 I would like to thank Peter Mair for his detailed comments on an 
earlier version of this article. Furthermore, I am grateful to the two 
anonymous reviewers and the editor of the journal, Hanspeter Kriesi, for 
their helpful suggestions.
cleavage approach may be that some links between parties and 
voters  are  firmer  than  others,  the  concept  travels  reasonably 
well.  In  fact,  Tóka (1998: 596) states that  the success of this 
“obscure concept” derives from the intuitive appeal of the idea 
that some motives of individual vote choice are more likely to 
“cement” party loyalties than others.
The article  is  structured as  follows.  First,  I  present  Rokkan’s 
model of party system formation in Western Europe, from which 
much of what may be considered “cleavage theory” is derived. I 
also address the controversies surrounding the question of what 
accounts for the subsequent stability of these party systems. In 
order  to  avoid  the  static  bias  inherent  in  the  approach,  the 
relationship  between  cleavage  politics  and  the  concepts  of 
dealignment  and  realignment  are  then  discussed.  While 
dealignment denotes the weakening of the established structure 
of conflict, by realignments we mean the process of forging new 
links between parties and social groups. This provides the point 
of departure for discussing the possible waning of the historical 
cleavages  and  the  advent  of  new  divisions  related  to  the 
expansion of education, the intensification of globalization, and 
identity politics, which may be related to critical junctures that 
have occurred after the original approach was developed. In all 
of  these  respects,  the  vast  amount  of  research  that  has  been 
pursued on Western Europe will allow me to be synthetic in my 
discussion.
The second part of this article is devoted to some recent uses of 
the cleavage concept in new democracies. First of all, making 
the approach travel requires identifying how critical  junctures 
other than those relevant in Western Europe may have shaped 
party systems, or, what is in fact more common, have failed to 
do  so.  It  is  the  absence  of  large-scale  processes  of  political 
change  and  upheaval,  coinciding  with  extensions  of  the 
democratic  suffrage  that  help  explain  why  clientelism  has 
remained  so  pervasive  in  many contexts  outside  the  Western 
world. Secondly, applications of the cleavage approach to more 
recent instances of party system formation have ascribed a more 
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prominent  role  to  political  actors  and  their  ability  to  shape 
politics.  While there are limits to the ability of elite actors to 
shape  partisan  ties  from  above,  the  experience  of  new 
democracies suggests that much of the empirical research in the 
cleavage tradition has suffered from an unwarranted degree of 
social determinism. One of the prime reasons for this has been 
the  focus  on  the  relatively  homogeneous  Western  European 
party systems, where a class cleavage has emerged everywhere. 
Another reason is that in closely following ongoing processes of 
party system formation in the new democracies, current research 
is less synthetic – and also less comparative – than was the case 
in  the  old democracies,  and consequently,  more attention has 
been  paid  to  how  actors  actively  forge  or  downplay  social 
divisions. 
With the virtual explosion of formal democratic rule around the 
globe in the past three decades, the geographical focus of the 
second part of this essay is necessarily limited. Most of the work 
in the cleavage tradition has focused on Latin America and on 
Central and Eastern Europe, and I will concentrate on these two 
regions. In the final part of this essay, I will briefly touch upon 
the  relationship  between  cleavages,  party  system 
institutionalization, and democratic consolidation. I conclude by 
pointing to common challenges for the study of cleavages in old 
and new democracies. 
Established Democracies and Their Cleavages, 
Old and New
The European Model
Across  Europe,  the  twin  processes  of  the  national  and  the 
industrial  revolutions  have  constituted  “critical  junctures” 
determining subsequent political development, and have led to 
long-term  alignments  between  social  groups  and  political 
parties.2 A first sketch of this macro-historical framework was 
presented  in  Seymour  Martin  Lipset  and  Stein  Rokkan’s 
introductory  chapter  to  their  edited  volume  entitled  Party 
Systems  and  Voter  Alignments (1967).  Rokkan’s  “Conceptual 
Map of Europe”, was then more fully developed in a number of 
essays collected in Rokkan (1970). More recently,  Peter Flora 
and his colleagues have edited an encompassing reconstruction 
of  Rokkan’s  work  on  state  and  nation  formation  and  mass 
politics in  Europe (Rokkan 1999,  2000).3 In  this account,  the 
national and the industrial revolutions have each resulted in two 
cleavages.  The  national  revolution  refers  to  the  process  of 
nation-state  formation.  The  antagonisms  to  emerge  from this 
revolution have been territorial on the one hand and cultural on 
the other. The  centre-periphery cleavage was triggered by “the 
conflict  between  the  central  nation-building  culture and  the 
increasing  resistance  of  the  ethnically,  linguistically,  or 
religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the 
peripheries”, while the  religious cleavage developed from “the 
conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing 
Nation-State and the historically established corporate privileges 
of the  Church” (Lipset, Rokkan 1990 [1967]: 101, emphasis in 
original). 
2 For a theoretical discussion of the concept of path dependency and of 
the mechanisms sustaining it, see Pierson (2000).
3 Rokkan’s most relevant writings on the subject are found in the article 
“Nation-Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass 
Politics” in Rokkan (1970), as well as in section IV, “Cleavage 
Structures and Party Systems” in Rokkan (1999/2000). An abbreviated 
version of the original Lipset-Rokkan article can be found in Lipset and 
Rokkan (1990).
As opposed  to  these  cultural  conflicts,  functional  oppositions 
have arisen only after a certain degree of internal consolidation 
of  the  national  territory  and  a  certain  level  of  cultural 
standardization.  The processes of state formation and external 
boundary  building  have  been  crucial  preconditions  for  the 
internal political structuring of the polity along functional lines, 
as Caramani (2004) and Bartolini (2005a: Ch. 2) have recently 
argued. Going back to Rokkan (1999), cross-local oppositions 
first  resulted from the  industrial  revolution, which in the 19th 
and  early  20th centuries  produced  two  cleavages:  a  sectoral 
cleavage between  the  first  and  the  secondary  sectors  of  the 
economy, opposing agricultural and industrial interests, and, as 
the historically youngest divide, the  class cleavage. While this 
last cleavage has not necessarily been the strongest one, it has 
probably received most attention in comparative politics because 
it has come to structure politics in every European country.
The mobilization of the four historical  cleavages identified in 
the  classic  approach  have  given  birth  to  the  modern  party 
systems in Europe. Subsequently, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
have  famously  noted,  the  full  mobilization  of  European 
electorates led to a “freezing” of the major party alternatives. 
Building on a new set of data with district-level electoral results, 
Caramani  (2004)  has  shown  that  the  end  of  territorially 
fragmented politics was an early process that came about as a 
consequence  of  the  national  spread  of  the  religiously  based 
opposition between liberals and conservatives. The formation of 
national party systems, in other words, was completed before the 
First World War. The basic structure of European party systems 
has thus proved remarkably stable throughout much of the 20th 
century, as Bartolini and Mair (1990) have demonstrated in their 
seminal  study  that  relies  on  aggregate  measures  of  volatility 
between ideological party blocks.  There is more disagreement 
on the stability of the divisions that underlie party systems and 
on the exact interpretation of the mystical “freezing” metaphor, 
however – two points I will return to later. 
The Concept of Cleavage: A Definition
The  intuitive  meaning  of  the  term  “cleavage” is  a  deep  and 
lasting division between groups based on some kind of conflict. 
Although  the  meaning  of  the  concept  may  thus  appear 
straightforward,  definitional  disputes  have  plagued  the  field. 
While the term has been and continues to be compounded with 
various adjectives, such as “social”, “attitudinal” or “political”, 
something of a consensus among those true to the Rokkanian 
legacy  has  emerged  around  a  definition  of  a  cleavage  put 
forward  by Bartolini  and  Mair  (1990:  213-220),  and  recently 
justified in more detail by Bartolini (2005b). According to this 
conceptualisation,  a  political  division  must  comprise  three 
elements  to  constitute  a  cleavage:  (1)  A  social-structural 
element,  such  as  class,  religious  denomination,  status,  or 
education,  (2)  an  element  of  collective  identity of  this  social 
group,  and (3) an  organizational manifestation in the form of 
collective action or a durable organization of the social groups 
concerned.  A  cleavage  is  thus  necessarily  a  “compounded 
divide”,  according  to  Bartolini  (2005b)  and  Deegan-Krause 
(2006,  2007),  encompassing interests,  normative or  attitudinal 
outlooks,  and a strong organizational base.  Both of the above 
authors develop typologies of divisions that exhibit  some, but 
not  all,  of  the  elements  characterizing  a  full  cleavage. 
Presumably, what accounts for the durability of cleavages as a 
basis for the political structuring of a political system is that they 
feature  all  elements.  Going  beyond  the  three  constituting 
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elements  of  a  cleavage,  then,  the  term  cleavage  is  usually 
reserved for durable patterns of political behaviour linking social 
groups and political organizations. 
Neither  the  basic  macro-historical  model  nor  the  definition 
presented above has provoked explicit resistance, even if some 
authors  continue  to  use  the  term  “cleavage” interchangeably 
with  “division”  or  “conflict”  (e.g.,  Moreno  1999).  More 
disagreement is evident when it comes to the sources of stability 
of the party systems formed by the historical cleavages, as well 
as  in  empirical  applications  of  the  concept.  One  of  the  most 
central  problems  is  how  cleavages  are  to  be  analyzed  in  a 
dynamic perspective. A related question is the somewhat unclear 
status  of  new  political  divisions  within  the  concept.  Allardt 
(1968)  has  noted  early  on  that  the  concept  has  a  static  bias. 
There is also a tendency to assume an extraordinary character of 
the original four divisions identified by Lipset and Rokkan. It is 
these points that I now address.
Differing Interpretations of the “Freezing-Hypothesis”: 
Cleavages and Party Systems
Contrary to  the  explanation of the  genesis  of  European party 
systems, the mechanisms accounting for their remarkable long-
term stability have not been analyzed in detail in the original 
Lipset-Rokkan article, and not in Rokkan’s later work (Rokkan 
1999). For the authors, as Mair (2001) points out, the so-called 
“freezing-hypothesis”  was  not  so  much  a  hypothesis  as  an 
empirical observation. Lipset and Rokkan (1990: 134) had stated 
that “[…] the  party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but 
significant  exceptions,  the  cleavage  structures of  the  1920s” 
(emphasis mine).  Empirical tests of the continuing validity of 
what is often presumed to be a hypothesis have proceeded along 
two main lines, as Mair (2001: 28-33) points out in an article 
devoted to the differing interpretation of this part of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s  argument.  These  approaches  are  based  on  differing 
interpretations of what exactly “froze” into place in the 1920s: 
(1) The first  possibility is  that  the  relationship between 
specific  segments  of society,  such as  classes  on the 
one hand and parties representing their interests on the 
other  hand,  was  established  in  the  early  process  of 
party  system  formation  and  remained  largely 
unchanged  thereafter.  The stability of  party systems 
thus  derives  from  the  social  groups  divided  by  a 
cleavage supporting the same parties generation after 
generation.  Scholars  adhering  to  this  view typically 
track  the  social  structural  determinants  of  voting 
behaviour in terms of class, religion, and urban-rural 
residence over time, allowing them to assess to which 
degree the original relationship between social groups 
and parties has remained intact. To explain the relative 
stability  of  party  systems  in  this  way  is  rather 
unrealistic  in  view  of  the  important  changes  in 
employment  structures,  religious  beliefs,  and 
geographical mobility. As Mair (2001: 30) points out, 
this understanding of “freezing” could only be correct 
if society itself were “frozen”. Empirical examples of 
this  line  of  inquiry will  be  reviewed in  more detail 
below.
(2) The  second  strategy  is  to  focus  on  the  stability  of  
party systems formed by the historical cleavages. Most 
of the work focusing on aggregate levels of electoral 
volatility if not explicitly, then at least implicitly, falls 
into this category.  This also applies to Bartolini  and 
Mair’s (1990) study. This perspective seeks to explain 
the  persistence  of  party  divisions  even  beyond  the 
conflicts that originally brought them into being, and 
follows  more  closely  from  the  macro-historical 
accounts  of  the  cleavage  concept.  In  this  reading, 
cleavages  entail  collective  political  identities  and 
organizational  loyalties  that  determine  individual 
political  behaviour,  and which are not easily broken 
down  or  diluted  by  new  political  movements.  The 
relationship  between  the  last  of  the  four  historical 
cleavages  and  the  three  historically  older  ones 
illustrates this nicely. The impact of the class divide, 
despite  representing  the  main  commonality  of 
European party systems, has been far from uniform in 
the different countries. On the one hand, this is due to 
the  country-specific  opportunities  for  alliances  with 
other  political  movements,  a  point  that  is  central  in 
Rokkan’s framework. Even more relevant, however, is 
that the class cleavage’s strength as well as the make-
up of its social basis have been heavily determined by 
the older cleavages and the loyalties and identities that 
they entailed (Rokkan 1999; 2000: 277-412, Bartolini 
2000: Ch.  8). Working-class parties thus found their 
mobilization space constrained by prior mobilization 
efforts  of  the  religious,  nationalist,  and  agrarian 
political movements. As a consequence, the share of 
the working-class vote for left  parties varies heavily 
across  countries,  and  so  does  the  social  structural 
homogeneity of the electorate mobilized by the left, as 
Bartolini’s  (2000:  497)  mapping  of  these  two 
dimensions  across  Western  Europe  impressively 
shows.
In most cases, the class cleavage was the last of the four original 
divides  to  become  mobilized,  and  subsequently  the  “support 
market” for new parties has been “narrowed” to such a degree as 
a result of the formation of mass parties that a “freezing of the 
major  party alternatives” was observable,  according to  Lipset 
and  Rokkan  (1990:  134).  A  frozen  party  system  is  thus 
equivalent  to  a  structurally  consolidated  or  institutionalized 
party  system,  in  Sartori’s  (1976)  terms.  The  stronger  a  party 
system structures the expectations of actors over time – at the 
elite as well  as at  the mass level – the more it  contributes to 
channelling old and new conflicts into established structures of 
competition. As Mair (2001: 38) suggests, “Predictability then 
becomes  a  surrogate  of  structuration:  the  more  predictable  a 
party system is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the 
more institutionalized it has become. This is also what freezing 
is about”. It is in fact the link between social divisions and party 
system  institutionalization  that  makes  the  cleavage  concept 
fruitful for the study of democratic consolidation, as I will argue 
later on.
This view also implies,  however, that changing links between 
social groups and parties are at least implicitly taken as a given. 
If  party  systems  retain  their  basic  shape  in  the  midst  of  an 
evolving  society,  then  this  can  only be  accounted  for  by the 
forming of new links between social  groups and parties. This 
reveals  that  Bartolini  and  Mair’s  (1990)  highly  influential 
definition of a cleavage is in fact somewhat problematic, since it 
can only be read and has in fact been interpreted as putting great 
emphasis  on  the  social  structural  homogeneity  of  parties’ 
electorates.  Even  the  authors  themselves,  in  other  instances, 
adhere to a far less strict understanding of cleavages. Both Mair 
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(1997) and Bartolini (2000) accept a long-term decline in the 
social  structural  homogeneity  of  a  party’s  electorate  as  quite 
natural.  Hence,  the authors’ definition,  emphasizing the social 
structure-collective  identity-organization  linkage,  seems 
adequate  primarily  to  analyze  the  initial  mobilization  of 
cleavages, since it corresponds to a mobilization sequence put in 
evidence  by  social  movement  research  (e.g.,  Tarrow  1992, 
Klandermans 1997): common interests fail to result in political 
mobilization  by  themselves.  In  the  absence  of  a  collective 
identity,  individuals will  not overcome the free-rider problem, 
and  thus  not  act  together  politically.  Perhaps  the  long-term 
impact of cleavages is also better explained by the persistence of 
the collective identities they entail than by the immutability of 
their social structural basis. I will return to this point in the last 
section  of  this  article  when  I  discuss  the  role  of  agency  in 
cleavage formation.
Party System Change: Linking Cleavage and Realignment 
Theory
At least since the early 1980s, when new value conflicts made 
their  way  onto  the  political  agenda  in  advanced  industrial 
democracies, the continuing validity of the freezing hypothesis 
has been questioned (e.g., Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984). Before 
turning to the content of the new conflicts that  many authors 
claim are disrupting traditional cleavage politics, I will discuss 
how the  cleavage  account  can  be  accommodated  with  party 
system change.  If  the  approach is  to  carry any weight  today, 
such an understanding is essential.
In  order  for  voters  to  become  available  to  the  mobilization 
efforts of new actors, the links between social groups and parties 
on which the established structure of conflict is based must have 
weakened.  If  this leads social  groups to actually abandon the 
party they have supported, we speak of dealignment, which can 
either be structural or behavioural (Martin 2000, Lachat 2007). 
In the case of  structural dealignment, modernization leads to a 
change in the strength of those social groups in which the old 
structure of conflict is anchored. Here, the long-term evolution 
of social structure weakens the grip of the established cleavages. 
For  example,  the  advent  of  a  post-industrial  economy  has 
resulted in a shrinking of the traditional working class,  while 
secularization  has  led  to  a  decline  in  the  share  of  regular 
churchgoers  in  Western  European  countries.  A party  system 
reflecting primarily these conflicts will therefore be less rooted 
in social structure than a few decades ago, opening a window of 
opportunity for the mobilization of new conflicts.
Processes of behavioural dealignment, on the other hand, are not 
necessarily connected to a gradual shift in the strength of social 
groups. Here, links between social groups and ideological party 
blocks formed by cleavages undergo change either because the 
old conflicts are pacified, or because new divisions are strong 
enough  to  disrupt  the  prevalent  patterns  of  conflict.  To  the 
degree  that  new issues  divide  the  same social  groups  as  the 
conflicts  that  have  been  prevailing  so  far,  they  are  easily 
reconcilable  with  the  predominating  antagonisms,  and  will 
simply  be  taken  up  by  parties.  As  a  result,  the  meaning  or 
political content of the dominant lines of conflict within a party 
system are to some degree altered. If, on the other hand, parties’ 
established electorates are divided concerning an issue that is 
new or was of minor salience hitherto, parties will try to avoid 
positioning  themselves  regarding  this  question.  When  a  new 
issue is highly salient, however, and cannot be integrated into 
the existing structure of conflict, then it is likely that one of the 
parties  within  the  system – or  a  new party – takes  them up. 
Consequently, the other parties will have to take sides as well, 
and the linkages between social groups and political parties may 
be reconfigured,  and cleavages altered. While old connections 
are  weakened  in  a  process  of  dealignment, new  and  salient 
issues  may lead to  the  formation of new linkages.  The latter 
processes are at the heart of the theory of political realignments  
(for overviews of the concept, see Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984, 
Martin 2000, Mayhew 2000). 
Small realignments may occur continuously, according to Martin 
(2000),  but  when  party  systems  adapt  to  new  structures  of 
conflict,  this  is  usually a  rather  eruptive  process,  and can  be 
traced  to  a  number  of  “critical  elections”,  characterized  by 
higher  levels  of  volatility  accompanying  the  modification  in 
party  constituencies.  This  eruptiveness  is  due  to  the  inherent 
inertia of party systems as a consequence of their freezing along 
historical  antagonisms,  and to  their  lack of  responsiveness  in 
times  of  “normal  politics”.  The  latter  in  the  theory  of 
realignment  denotes  phases  where  the  system  is  stable  and 
where  the  prevailing  alignments  are  not  altered  because,  in 
Schattschneider’s  (1975)  famous  words,  the  established 
cleavage  structure  tends  to  “organize”  issues  cutting  across 
established lines of division “out of politics”. 
Martin  (2000:  84-86,  422-427)  has  developed  an  elegant 
depiction  of  how  the  cleavage  concept  relates  to  such 
extraordinary  phases  of  party  system  change.  It  is  useful  to 
distinguish three levels of analysis or of abstraction in studying 
politics,  two of which are  related to  cleavage theory and the 
realignment approach respectively:
(1) The most  fundamental  forces  of politics lie  in the 
long-term evolution of social structure, the primary 
focus  of  cleavage-theory. Here,  the  focus  is  on 
critical junctures such as the national and industrial 
revolutions,  which create  structural potentials that 
political  actors  can  mobilize.  When cleavages  are 
mobilized by parties and institutionalized in a party 
system, they will reproduce political alignments in 
a  path-dependent  manner  until  transformations  in 
the  social  structure  create  new potentials  that  are 
capable  of  disrupting  the  older  structure  of 
alignments.  Following  Allardt  (1968)  and  Kriesi 
(1999),  it  can  be  argued  that  the  educational 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s has  constituted 
such  a  new  critical  juncture.  It  has  also  been 
claimed  that  the  processes  of  globalization  and 
Europeanization,  which  have  intensified  since  the 
1980s  and  1990s,  create  winners  and  losers  that 
political parties have tried to mobilize (Kriesi et al. 
2006,  2008).  A  dissenting  voice  comes  from 
Bartolini  (2005a):  in  emphasizing  the  process  of 
nation-state  formation  or  boundary  building  as  a 
precondition  for  the  formation  of  the  historical 
cleavages,  he  argues that  the  lowering of  national 
boundaries  in  the  process  of  European  integration 
does not lead to a new line of opposition, but to a 
de-structuring of the functional cleavages that were 
prevalent at the national level.
(2) Political potentials resulting from a changing social 
structure  do  not  translate  directly  into  new 
antagonisms  within  the  party  system  due  to  the 
force  of  existing  alignments  and  the  freezing  of 
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party  systems  along  historical  divides.  The 
established  parties  will  seek  to  avert  the  entry of 
new parties by responding to new potentials within 
the  electorate,  within  the  limits  set  by  their 
historical  position.  The  adaptation  of  the  existing 
structure of conflicts to new potentials is the central 
focus of the theory of political realignments, which 
is situated at an intermediate level of analysis. The 
weakening  of  prevailing  alignments  and  the 
emergence  of  conflicts  cutting across  a  prevailing 
cleavage  makes  electoral  coalitions,  united  by 
virtue of a cleavage, break apart and opens the way 
for  the  establishment  of  new links  between  social  
groups and political parties.4
(3) The  least  abstract  level  of  analysis  focuses  on 
everyday  politics.  Here,  cyclical  issues  of  minor 
importance, corruption scandals and the popularity 
or  unpopularity  of  politicians  and  governments 
affect  the  results  of elections.  Even if  such issues 
dominate  everyday  politics,  these  events  rarely 
affect  the  two  higher  levels  of  political 
development.
In a restructuring of oppositions in a party system, levels one 
and two interact and therefore have to be analyzed jointly. As 
outlined earlier on, to what degree the old conflicts are capable 
of organizing new ones out of politics depends not only on the 
intensity  of  the  new  conflicts,  but  also  on  the  grip  of  the 
established  cleavage  structure.  Kriesi  and  Duyvendak  (1995) 
have postulated a zero-sum relationship between old and new 
conflicts,  and  much  therefore  depends  on  whether  the 
established cleavages have been pacified and on the degree of 
social closure characterizing the social groups that are divided 
by  them.  Together,  these  elements  condition  the  stability  of 
political alignments. 
In my view, this implies that attention must be paid to the issues 
that  political  conflict  is  actually about,  and  how these  issues 
relate to traditional conflicts.  For one thing,  this allows us to 
assess to which degree political conflicts prevalent in the party 
system are  in  line  with,  and  therefore  serve  to  reinforce  the 
established cleavages. For another, behavioural dealignment can 
be a consequence of a change in parties’ programmatic offer. If 
parties converge along a cleavage, the established links between 
parties  and  voters  become  fragile.  Inversely,  the  same 
presumably happens if parties continue to represent a conflict 
that no longer matters to voters. For all these reasons, it is useful 
to  analyze  to  which  degree  parties  stick  to  their  established 
ideologies  or  whether  they  adopt  new positions.  Taking  this 
reasoning further, it is possible to distinguish various types of 
divide that have varying consequences for the manifestation of 
new conflicts (see Bornschier, Forthcoming: Ch. 3). The degree 
of polarization, the stability of alignments between parties and 
voters,  as  well  as  the  congruence  between  the  programmatic 
positions of parties and their electorates are all likely to impinge 
on the durability of cleavages. Cleavages can be characterized 
by segmentation, meaning that parties have strongly diverging 
positions  and  parties,  and  voters  are  durably aligned  along a 
conflict.  Alternatively,  they can live  on primarily in  terms of 
ideology and feelings of belonging, without being reinforced by 
contrasting  voter  orientations  and  party  positions.  Finally, 
parties  may  form  “cartels”  (Katz  and  Mair  1995),  reflecting 
4 Enyedi (2008) provides an instructive overview of the debate 
concerning dealignment and realignment in Western Europe.
cleavages that no longer matter to voters. Hence, different types 
of  cleavage  vary in  their  ability to  preclude  new conflicts  to 
manifest themselves politically. 
Empirical Assessments of the Persistence of the Traditional 
Cleavages and the Emergence of New Divisions
The question to which degree historical cleavages still determine 
political  behaviour  today  has  been  approached  from  two 
perspectives. One approach centres on the social structural basis 
of cleavages, while the other focuses on the way new political 
issues  have  transformed  the  meaning  of  the  historical 
antagonisms. In the following, I first review the society-centred 
approach  and  then  turn  to  the  question  of  how  it  has  been 
combined with a focus on elite political actors.
“Bottom-up” approaches: The social structural basis of  party  
choice. The literature on the persistence or change of the social 
structural basis of party preferences has mainly focused on the 
class  cleavage  and  has  produced  contradictory results.5 In  an 
important comparative over-time study of the class cleavage in a 
wide array of advanced democracies, Franklin et al. (1992) state 
that the explanatory power of the classical socio-demographic 
variables has declined in most countries examined. In the two 
European countries where this is  not the case – Italy and the 
Netherlands – cohort differences lead them to assume that they 
will follow suit. 
Divergent  findings  are  presented  by authors  employing  more 
refined  class  schemata  and statistical  tools,  such as  the  work 
assembled  in  the  volume  edited  by Evans  (1999a),  a  second 
large comparative research endeavour in the field. Some of the 
contributors to this book either fail to find such uniform trends 
across countries (Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf 1999, Weakliem, Heath 
1999), while others can show that, at least in certain countries, 
socio-structural  characteristics  do  not  structure  voting  choice 
substantially  less  than  thirty  years  ago  (e.g.,  Müller  1999). 
While Evans (1999b) criticizes Franklin et al.’s (1992) work for 
employing  an  inadequate  and  out-dated  conception  of  social 
class, the difference between the two approaches is in fact more 
conceptual than methodological. Relying on the classical blue-
collar vs. white-collar distinction, Franklin et al. (1992) are in a 
position  to  address  the  question  to  which  degree  established 
bonds between social groups and political parties have either 
remained  stable  or  have  waned  in  force.  On the  other  hand, 
Evans (1999b: 12) argues that only class schemata employing 
more fine-tuned class distinctions are apt to detect processes of 
realignment. Consequently,  they have  little  to  say concerning 
what the policy antagonisms are about that have resulted in the 
new alignments  they  discover.  As  Mair  (1999)  and  Franklin 
(2002)  have  both  pointed  out,  this  tells  us  a  lot  about  class  
voting, but less about class politics, contrary to what the book’s 
title would suggest. More than offering a test of the strength of 
the historical cleavages, then, this is an analysis of the existence 
of structurally based conflicts as such.6
Many of the more recent studies on the evolution of cleavages 
over  long  spans  of  time  have  also  focused  on  the  religious 
cleavage as the second common structuring element of Western 
European  party systems  (e.g.,  Knutsen  2004,  Oskarson  2005, 
5 Most of the literature I review in this section comes from research on 
voting behaviour. See Brooks et al. (2003) for an overview of this field 
and the place of cleavage-based models within it.
6 For an argument in defence of the continued significance of class 
voting and a more complete review of the literature, see Evans (2000).
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Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, Manza 2006, Lachat 2007, Elff 2007a).7 
While the impact of religious denomination has often declined, 
religiosity,  commonly measured  in  terms  of  the  frequency of 
church  attendance,  continues  to  have  an  impact  on  voting 
choices.  One  should  note,  however,  that  this  measurement 
moves  the  analysis  away  from  religious  groups  as  social 
structural categories with clear-cut and not easily to overcome 
boundaries to a more value-based conception of religion. It  is 
then quite natural that the impact of religiosity on voting choices 
is  stronger  than  that  of  religious  denomination.  Ultimately, 
whether  or  not  we  conceive  politics  as  based  on  cleavages 
depends on how we understand and define social structure. If we 
conceive  the  social  structural  element  in  terms  of  the  social 
groups that have brought the original cleavages into being, then 
politics has quite certainly lost  its  cleavage basis,  even if the 
lasting  impact  of  religiosity  suggests  that  the  corresponding 
conflict  somehow  lives  on.  On  the  other  hand,  we  can 
understand cleavage-based political behaviour as rooted in the 
durable  identification  with  social  groups  as  opposed  to  free-
floating or fully context-dependent political orientations. In this 
case,  answering the question of whether or not cleavages still 
exist  becomes  a  matter  of  defining  the  right  categories  and 
analyzing  the  uniformity  of  political  behaviour  its  members 
exhibit.
While much work has been done on the link between the social 
structural and the organizational elements of the traditional or 
transformed cleavages in terms of voting choices, the inclusion 
of the collective identity element has faced obstacles that have 
been difficult  to overcome. This is  mainly for the reason that 
survey data rarely allows the measurement of group attachments 
as individual-level equivalents of collective identity. Weakliem’s 
(1993) study on class consciousness in Britain shows, however, 
that only members of the working class that were class-aware 
voted for the Labour party rather than for the Conservatives in 
the  1960s.  This  underlines  the  crucial  importance  of  the 
collective identity element in cleavage mobilization processes. 
Bartolini’s  (2005a,  2005b)  recent  work  has  focused  on  the 
question under which circumstances individuals identify with a 
social  group  and  act  collectively  on  its  behalf.  Drawing  on 
Hirschman (1970) and Tajfel (1981), he argues that collective 
action  is  only  likely  in  situations  where  social  mobility  is 
restrained and group boundaries difficult to transcend, thereby 
precluding individualistic strategies to attain (political) goals.
The  only  explicit  attempt,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  to 
include all three elements constituting a cleavage in empirical 
analyses  of  political  behaviour  is  the  essay  by  Knutsen  and 
Scarbrough  (1995),  and  Tóka’s  (1998)  application  of  their 
approach  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Here,  the  authors 
overcome the lack of data by using shared value preferences as 
an  expression  of  collective  identity.  In  their  model,  cleavage 
voting is analytically distinguished from social structural voting 
as well as from value-based voting in that it has to include both 
of  the  other  elements.  Cleavage  voting then follows  a  causal 
chain  where  social  structure  influences  values  and  values 
influence voting choice. Empirically, however, voting behaviour 
partly  follows  this  chain,  but  not  exclusively.  Not  quite 
surprisingly, values turn out to have an independent impact on 
party  preference  as  well.  More  strikingly,  another  path  leads 
from social structural  characteristics directly to voting choice, 
without  running  through  shared  values.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
7 For an analysis of the impact of these and other cleavages on voting 
behaviour in the US, see Manza and Brooks (1999). 
Knutsen  and  Scarbrough  (1995:  514)  conclude  that  only  the 
Netherlands  turns  out  to  conform  to  the  “stereotypy”  of 
cleavage-dominated politics. Hence, in their analysis, cleavages 
hardly have an impact, which is quite striking, to say the least. 
Rather  than  dismissing  cleavage  politics  altogether,  this  may 
point  to  the  difficulty  of  finding  appropriate  categories  to 
measure social structure and collective identity.
 “Top-down” and combined approaches: integrating the role of  
parties. A different body of work approaches the issue primarily 
from the perspective of the political parties or party systems to 
which the historical cleavages have given birth. In other words, 
these  authors  adhere  more  to  the  second interpretation of  the 
freezing hypothesis outlined above. Because parties reflect the 
identities and interests of social groups, they reproduce or can 
even  construct  collective  identities,  as  Sartori  (1968)  has 
claimed early on. Scholars within this tradition have probably 
paid  most  attention  to  parties’  responses  to  new  political 
potentials that have arisen from the transition to post-industrial 
society, as exemplified in the work of Mair (1997) and Kitschelt 
(1994, 1995). As Mair (1997) has insisted, the historical party 
organization’s remarkable resilience over time is precisely due 
to its ability to adapt to structural and cultural changes. 
Ideally,  from a cleavage perspective, research should focus on 
the interaction of the structural basis of political alignments and 
parties’  mobilizing  strategies.  For  instance,  class  voting  is 
presumably related to the degree to which party programs make 
reference to social class (Evans 2000: 413). Elff (2007b) pursues 
an  analysis  of  this  sort  using  data  from  the  Comparative 
Manifesto  Project  (see  Budge  et  al.  2001,  Klingemann  et  al. 
2006). His results shows that at the aggregate level, both class 
and  religious  voting  are  influenced  by parties’ programmatic 
offer in most countries. 
This  tells  us  something  about  the  reasons  for  dealignment 
between parties and voters,  but not much about the forces of 
change.  An  obvious  starting  point  here  are  the  conflicts  the 
“New Politics” literature singles out as particularly important in 
post-industrial  societies  (Inglehart  1977,  1997).  According  to 
some  authors,  value-based  divides  are  crosscutting  the  older 
distributional or class cleavage, which was closely tied to social 
structural characteristics (see Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984, and 
therein  especially  Inglehart  1984).  Centring  on  questions  of 
lifestyle and moral guidelines, this opposition is now commonly 
referred to as one between libertarian and authoritarian values 
(Kitschelt  1994,  Flanagan,  Lee  2003).  Kitschelt  (1994,  1995) 
has  most  explicitly  and  convincingly  related  this  new value 
opposition  to  transformations  in  Western  European  party 
systems. His work has focused on the transformation of Social 
Democratic  parties  and  the  emergence  or  reinvigoration  of 
parties  of  the  Radical  Right,  relating  these  evolutions  to  the 
dimensions underlying the attitudinal space of European mass 
publics.  Data  constraints  preclude  a  rigorous  test  of  the 
hypotheses  regarding the social  structural  foundation of  these 
attitudes, however. 
Until  we  have  been  able  to  show  that  these  conflicts  are 
anchored in social structure just like the older class and religious 
conflicts, the value divide cannot be called a cleavage. After all, 
the  older  divides  had  important  cultural  components  as  well 
(Knutsen  and  Scarbrough  1995,  Bartolini  2000:  16). 
Furthermore,  in  propagating  a  new  value  cleavage,  we  risk 
jumping rather quickly from cleavages that resulted from large 
macro-historical  processes to  value differences which are still 
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rather  young  and  of  which  we  do  not  know if  they will  be 
characterized  by the  same  persistence.  What,  then,  could  the 
social structural basis be that makes a long-term structuring of 
politics along these conflicts plausible?
One approach holds that class antagonisms continue to be the 
bread and butter of politics. Kriesi (1998), for example, starts off 
with  concrete  libertarian-authoritarian  value  conflicts  and 
attempts  to  find  their  social  structural  base  by differentiating 
within the “new” middle class.  Both Kriesi  (1993,  1998) and 
Müller (1999) have shown that significant divisions have arisen 
concomitantly to the expansion of the middle class. These are 
rooted in different work logics and the degree of hierarchy or 
autonomy they involve. As it turns out, however, class position 
does not entirely account for these value differences. This may 
either indicate that the value divide lacks a clear social structural 
foundation, or, what is just as plausible, we lack the appropriate 
categories  and  concepts  to  make  sense  of  contemporary 
antagonisms and their roots in an evolving social structure. Ever 
more  refined  conceptions  of  class  have  responded  to  recent 
changes  in  employment  structures.  While  retaining  classical 
vertical class divisions, Oesch (2006) complements these with a 
horizontal differentiation based on work logic. This helps him to 
identify the social support base of new parties of the populist 
right (Oesch 2008). 
A second hypothesis suggests that differences in education may 
be the driving forces of the new value conflicts. Allardt (1968) 
has suggested early on that new cleavages could emerge as a 
product of the “educational revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which has led to a significant expansion of higher education. In 
fact, it can be shown that while the advent of new value conflicts 
has  blurred  the  social  structural  homogeneity  of  the  classical 
left-right  opposition  in  terms  of  social  class,  political 
preferences are now two-dimensional, one of them being a value 
dimension  that  is  closely  related  to  education  (Kriesi  et  al. 
2008). And education also has a strong influence on party choice 
(e.g., Knutsen 2004), in particular concerning the ecologists and 
the populist right, the two party families that resulted from the 
new cultural conflicts that have played an important role since 
the  late  1960s  (Bornschier,  Forthcoming).  Furthermore,  in  a 
pioneering  study  based  on  a  specially  administered  survey 
conducted in Denmark,  Stubager (2009) reveals that  high and 
low  educational  groups  do  in  fact  exhibit  some  degree  of 
collective identity and perceive an antagonism with  the  other 
educational group in terms of interests. These findings point to 
the emergence of a full-fledged cleavage encompassing social 
groups that exhibit a shared consciousness. 
A  final  line  of  research  interprets  differences  between 
educational groups as part of a more encompassing antagonism 
between the “winners” and “losers” of the economic, cultural, 
and  political  processes  of  globalization  of  the  past  decades 
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). After the emergence of a libertarian-
authoritarian  divide  in  the  1970s,  these  processes  have 
transformed cultural conflicts and party systems yet again. Their 
analysis  shows that this is  one of two dimensions structuring 
party positions and voter  orientations  in  Western  Europe,  the 
other dimension being the state-market cleavage, which remains 
salient. Furthermore, conflicts over European integration, which 
have received considerable attention recently (e.g., Marks et al. 
2006),  have  become  “embedded”  into  this  two-dimensional 
structure of conflict, according to Kriesi et al. By focusing on 
the location of social groups and party electorates in the political 
space created by these two dimensions, they show that each of 
them  divides  social  groups  defined  in  terms  of  class  and 
education, while religion has lost much of its political impact. 
Including data on party positions also allows a focus on the way 
party political actors have mobilized new structural potentials, 
thus  combining  “bottom-up”  and  “top-down”  approaches  to 
cleavages.
The Formation of Cleavages in New Democracies
Making the cleavage concept travel
The application of the  cleavage  concept  outside the founding 
democracies in the West has faced formidable obstacles. Either 
the national and industrial revolutions have not occurred in the 
same form as in Western Europe, or they have failed to produce 
a similarly lasting impact on party systems (see Randall 2001, 
Cammack 1994). As van Biezen and Caramani (2007: 7-8) note, 
“The  concept  of  cleavage  is  the  product  of  a  very  specific 
transformation that took place in Western Europe exclusively”, 
and coincided with the expansion of democratic voting rights. In 
Latin  America,  for  example,  states consolidated their  territory 
under  colonial  rule  and  most  of  them  never  saw  anything 
comparable to the national revolution with the ensuing conflicts 
characteristic  of  Western  Europe.  Similarly,  universal  voting 
rights  were  often  granted  long  before  the  formation  of  a 
significant working class, and due to the widespread practice of 
clientelism, the formation of class-based parties was retarded for 
decades. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) have recently shown that 
there  is  nothing  automatic  in  the  stabilization  of  interparty 
competition over time. Although a lot has been said about rising 
levels  of  electoral  instability  in  western  democracies,  the 
advanced industrial democracies remain distinctive for their low 
levels  of volatility.  These lasting differences are  the  result  of 
specific historical  sequences and subsequent path dependency, 
according  to  the  authors.  Beyond  this  somewhat  schematic 
contrast, however, lies a great diversity in the degree to which 
party systems in new democracies are rooted in society. 
In  order  to  fruitfully  apply  the  cleavage  concept  to  new 
democracies, hence, a number of modifications of the original 
approach are in order. First, we must abstract from the European 
experience in looking for the critical junctures that have left a 
lasting  stamp  on  party  systems  in  some  countries  but  not  in 
others.  In  the  next  section,  I  will  review  some  of  the  rare 
comparative  work  that  has  undertaken  this  step,  focusing 
predominantly  on  Latin  America.  Secondly,  a  more  adequate 
understanding of  the  role  of  agency in  cleavage  formation  is 
necessary.  Established elites may not only have an interest in, 
they may also be capable of shaping party systems and even of 
preventing social  structure  from manifesting  itself  in  politics. 
Accounts of this kind are somewhat alien to the macro-historical 
literature on Western Europe, where the standardizing force of 
the  national  and  industrial  revolutions  has  allowed  a  social 
determinism  to  survive  that  does  not  fare  well  in  new 
democracies. The starting point for a focus on political actors is 
the founding moment of a new democratic regime. However, we 
also need to  understand how cleavages can emerge gradually 
over  long  periods  of  time  and  in  the  absence  of  large-scale 
processes  that  accelerate  the  institutionalization  of  party 
systems.  Here,  I  will  review some of the  recent  literature  on 
political conflicts that may eventually result in the manifestation 
of cleavages in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
elsewhere.
Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2009  |  7
Critical Junctures: Adapting and Extending the Macro-
Historical Account
Since many Latin  American countries’ initial  experience with 
democracy dates back to the first half of the 20th century, the 
recent  wave  of  democracy  meant  re-democratization  on  this 
continent. As a result, a number of Latin America’s parties are 
much older than those in other third wave countries, and some 
of  the  rare  work  in  the  cleavage  tradition  outside  Western 
Europe and the US has focused on this continent. The starting 
point, nonetheless, is usually the peculiar absence of the kind of 
cleavages  that  have  manifested  themselves  in  the  developed 
world.  To  begin  with,  religious  homogeneity  and  early  state 
consolidation  under  colonial  rule  and  the  coincidence  of 
industrial and landed interests do not lead us to expect strong 
religious  or  sectoral  cleavages  in  Latin  America  (Dix  1989, 
Coppedge 1998). The near-absence of strong class-based parties 
in the midst of extraordinarily high levels of inequality and the 
predominance  of  catch-all  parties  even  in  the  early stages  of 
political development is more surprising, however. Dix explains 
this  with  the  timing  of  the  expansion  of  the  suffrage,  which 
occurred  “(…)  relatively  early  and  ‘from  above’,  by  elites 
seeking political allies or pursuing a strategy of cooptation, thus 
precluding  a  prolonged  consciousness-raising  struggle  for 
political participation” (1989: 33).
What makes Latin America a particularly interesting region to 
apply cleavage theory is the amount of intra-regional variation 
both in party system institutionalization and in the degree that 
party systems reflect social structure. Path-breaking attempts at 
measuring  party  system institutionalization,  assessing  parties’ 
roots in society and the regularities in the interactions among 
them, underscore the diversity of Latin American politics (Dix 
1992, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Only a few scholars have 
applied a historical cleavage framework to try to make sense of 
these differences (Dix 1989, Coppedge 1998), but their research 
testifies  to  the  applicability  of  the  concept  outside  Western 
Europe. Collier and Collier’s (1991) study certainly represents 
the most ambitious and theoretically elaborate application of the 
concept of critical junctures, which they consider the essence of 
the cleavage approach, to regime dynamics to Latin America. I 
will not discuss their book in detail, however; not only because 
of its  monumental  scope,  but primarily because their  analysis 
does not explain the genesis of the party system as such,  but 
focuses  on  the  later  stage  of  the  incorporation  of  the  labour 
movement  and its long-term impact on party competition and 
the viability of democracy. 
While some party systems like the Brazilian one seem to have 
emerged  more  or  less  from scratch  after  every  disruption  of 
democratic rule, the party systems in Colombia, Uruguay, and 
Chile have not changed very much since the first decades of the 
20th century. Strong linkages between parties and voters seem to 
have  “frozen” these  party systems  into  place much like  their 
European  counterparts.  This  has  not  resulted  in  the  same 
conflicts being represented, however. Coppedge’s (1998) paper 
is the creative attempt to apply not the Rokkanian variables but 
his  logic  of  thinking  to  explain  the  differences  in  social 
entrenchment  of  the  party  system  in  eleven  Latin  American 
countries.  In  the  aftermath  of  independence  and  prior  to  the 
extension  of  the  franchise,  a  common  antagonism  between 
liberals and conservatives similar to the one in Western Europe 
was predominant  throughout  the region (Coppedge 1998,  Dix 
1989). In Uruguay and Colombia, where a protracted civil war 
between these two groups divided the citizenry into two halves, 
this division is still reflected in the party system. Similar to the 
pluralist parties of North America (see Epstein 1980), the two 
traditional parties in Uruguay are catch-all parties that do not 
have clear-cut links to social structure. Thus, while the division 
between them falls short of being a full cleavage according to 
the  definition  outlined  earlier  on,  the  early  extension  of  the 
franchise  to  the  entire  adult  population  has  frozen  the  party 
system into place along this line of division. Even if new parties 
emerged  later  on,  this  was  a  slow  process  characteristic  of 
strongly institutionalized party systems. 
The  gradual  expansion  of  suffrage  in  Chile  has  produced  an 
institutionalized system of parties with a more clear-cut social 
basis.  In  fact,  the  party system preceding Pinochet’s  military 
coup reflected a Catholic-secular and a class cleavage much like 
in Europe. It is only in the process of re-democratization, and as 
a  consequence  of  the  deliberate  strategies  of  the  parties 
supporting  democracy,  that  these  conflicts  have  lost  in 
importance (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003), a point I will return 
to. In Brazil, on the other hand, universal suffrage came in 1945, 
long before a substantial working class existed, had effectively 
organized,  and  called  for  the  vote.  Together  with  the 
establishment of a state-sponsored workers’ party, this precluded 
a clear class cleavage from materializing to this day despite high 
levels  of  socio-economic  inequality  (for  recent  evidence,  see 
Samuels 2006). From a cleavage perspective, the absence of a 
class-based  party  in  Brazil  can  be  explained  by  the  skilful 
obviation of the process of collective identity formation of the 
lower classes by the ruling elites, reinforced by the crafting of 
clientelistic bonds between citizens and elected representatives 
(Bornschier 2008). Until recently, this allowed political elites to 
control politics and to contain the growth of party mobilization 
from below (Hagopian 1996). 
The contrast between the Brazilian and the Chilenian case thus 
supports  the  hypothesis  that  the  timing and the magnitude of 
suffrage  extensions,  by  determining  the  homogeneity  of  the 
social groups that are enfranchised, impinges on the specificity 
of  the  interests  that  parties  reflect.8 What  Dix  (1989)  and 
Coppedge (1998) neglect, however, is that it cannot be taken for 
granted that parties represent the interests of social groups at all. 
As Kitschelt  (2000) and Kitschelt  and Wilkinson (2007) have 
lain out,  we can distinguish between clientelistic, charismatic, 
and  programmatic  linkages  between  politicians  and  voters  in 
democratic  politics.  Without  strong  mobilization  from below, 
and when they have access to the resources that clientelism and 
patronage require, established parties will have little incentive to 
rely  on  programs.  Only  “externally  mobilized  parties”,  as 
Shefter (1977, 1993) has called them, which come from outside 
the ruling circles of power, push for programmatic competition – 
because programs are all they have to offer. Their task is not an 
easy one, however. Parties of this kind, which seek to mobilize 
functional oppositions based on class or other interests, must be 
capable of disrupting vertical  links of authority and exchange 
that  predominate  in  many  less-developed  countries,  which 
Chalmers (1977) described in a seminal article trying to make 
sense of the missing societal roots of Latin American parties.
While Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argue quite convincingly 
that clientelism simply becomes too expensive to be worthwhile 
for politicians at a certain point, the level of development would 
8 See also Bartolini (2000: Ch. 5) who finds that differences in the 
timing and the tempo of suffrage expansion have had a lasting influence 
on the strength of the left and on the character of its support base across 
Western Europe. 
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have led us to expect programmatic parties long ago in many 
parts  of  Latin  America,  as  Dix  (1989)  has  stated.  Thus,  the 
process  by  which  pervasive  clientelism  gives  way  to  more 
programmatically based politics  remains poorly understood to 
date.  In  their  pioneering  study  of  elite-mass  congruence  in 
policy preferences across Latin America, Luna and Zechmeister 
(2005) have shown that not only social and economic variables, 
such as the level of poverty, impinge on programmatic linkages 
between  citizens  and  policymakers  but  also  the  degree  of 
institutionalization of the party system and the strength of leftist 
parties. The institutionalization of political conflict characteristic 
of  cleavage-based  party  systems,  in  other  words,  seems  to 
promote accountability and crowd out clientelistic mobilization. 
This process closely parallels what happened in Europe roughly 
a  century earlier.  As  Sartori  (1994:  95f.)  has  pointed  out:  “I 
cannot  think  of  any  party  system  that  has  evolved  into  a 
veritable  ‘system’  made  of  strong,  organization-based  mass 
parties  on  the  basis  of  internal parliamentary  learning.  The 
metamorphosis  from  an  unstructured  to  a  structured  party 
system  has  always  been  triggered  by  exogenous assault  and 
contagion.  The earlier parties of notables or of opinion either 
perished or changed their ways in response to the challenge of 
externally  created  (and  largely  anti-system)  mass  parties 
characterized by strong ideological ties and fervor” (emphasis in 
original).  This  clearly points  to  the  role  of  political  actors  in 
mobilizing cleavages,  the last  research topic  I  address  in  this 
essay.
Political Agency and the Politicization of Social Structure
If  collective identities are conceived as being to some degree 
socially  constructed,  the  collective  identity  element  that 
cleavages encompass should quite naturally draw attention to the 
actors who help in creating such identifications. Yet, despite the 
fact  that  some  time  has  passed  since  Sartori  (1968)  and 
Zuckerman  (1975)  urged  for  a  focus  on  political  elites  in 
cleavage formation, the role of agency in cleavage formation has 
become a prominent topic in research only recently. As Enyedi 
(2005:  699)  states,  “(…)  interpretative  frameworks  of  the 
political  elites  decisively  influence  whether  differences  of 
interests are perceived as social conflicts. (…) In this approach, 
parties  are  perceived  as  political  actors  combining  interests, 
values, cultural milieus and social networks”. In a book on the 
divergent paths of the Czech Republic and Slovakia after their 
break-up, Deegan-Krause (2006: 207) notes: “Although leaders 
cannot necessarily control the relationship between attitudes and 
party choice, they can exert strong influences”. Since historical 
cleavages are giving way to new conflicts, top-down approaches 
have  become,  as  we  have  seen,  more  diffused  in  the  old 
democracies as well. Even more, however, the focus on recent 
experiences of democratization has driven attention to the ways 
elite actors shape nascent party systems.  Chhibber and Torcal 
(1997)  suggest  that  agency  plays  a  larger  role  in  the  new 
democracies because party elites have greater flexibility to make 
strategic choices in societies where secondary organizations are 
less developed. 
Particularly in research on Central and Eastern Europe, scholars 
have pointed to the importance of the founding moments of the 
democratic  regime,  when  new  parties  are  established.  The 
absence  of  strong  cleavages  that  make  party  systems  reflect 
social structure in Central and Eastern Europe can be explained 
by the failure of the critical junctures that have been decisive in 
Western  Europe  to  leave  their  imprint,  compounded  by  the 
period  of  socialist  rule  (Caramani  2003,  van  Biezen  and 
Caramani  2007).  Nonetheless,  broad  economic  and  cultural 
structures,  differences  in  the  marketization,  in  ethnic  and 
religious diversity, and the like, are likely to affect the make-up 
of  party  systems  and  relevant  issue  dimensions  in  post-
communist countries (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 2000, Elster, 
Offe, Preuss 1998, Lawson et al. 1999, Kitschelt et al. 1999).9
As an example of such an approach, Kitschelt and his colleagues 
(1999) distinguish different types of communist rule that interact 
with elite strategies and the electoral rules and thereby derive 
predictions  about  the  character  of  oppositions  in  the  nascent 
party  systems.  Depending  on  the  degree  to  which  a  formal-
rational  state  apparatus  existed  already under  communist  rule 
and  on  how the  communist  parties  instilled  compliance  with 
their rule, political competition is either likely to evolve around 
clientelistic goods or around programmatic competition.  Here, 
the  analysis  builds  on  Shefter’s  (1977,  1993)  work,  already 
referred  to.  The  cases  where  competition  is  primarily 
programmatic,  either  economic,  religious-cultural  conflicts,  or 
both types of conflict can be prevalent, as exemplified by the 
cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland respectively. 
Elites thus face incentives based on historical and institutional 
factors  and  are  constrained  by the  dimensionality  underlying 
citizen  orientations.  Whether  the  dimensions  of  conflict 
mobilized in the 1990s will develop into cleavages by exhibiting 
clear-cut social  bases and acquiring a high degree of stability 
remains  to  be  seen.  If  cleavages  are  to  emerge  in  new 
democracies  at  all,  however,  they are  likely to  look different 
than  in  Western  Europe.  An  approach  centred  on  specific 
countries’  historical  development  is  therefore  promising  in 
predicting  how  party  systems  may  become  rooted  in  social 
structure.
Building  exclusively  on  demand-side  data,  Moreno  (1999) 
identifies issue divides in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and 
Western Europe that sometimes, but not always have a structural 
basis.  Discriminant  analyses  then reveal  which of these issue 
divides underlie citizen-party alignments, and are thus reflected 
in the party system. Similar to the findings of Kitschelt and his 
colleagues, regime divides between supporters and opponents of 
accountability and democratic rule are evident in a number of 
new  democracies,  reflecting  winners  and  losers  of 
democratization. In other contexts, divergences over economic 
reform appear more salient. One of the focal points of political 
agency  is  situated  here  between  the  constraints  provided  by 
citizen  orientations  and  the  patterns  of  opposition  ultimately 
represented in the party system: to a certain degree, elites have 
the ability to combine the various issue dimensions differently 
into over-arching divides or cleavages (Deegan-Krause 2006).
To the degree that divides have come to shape party systems, the 
question is  how durable  its  impact is  likely to  be.  Zielinski’s 
(2002) game-theoretical  model represents the extreme case of 
attributing central  importance to the first  divisions to emerge. 
Assuming  the  ability  of  political  actors  to  make  political 
competition diverge from the underlying social conflicts and an 
inherent  tendency  of  party  systems  to  freeze  into  place  by 
discouraging  the  entry  of  new  competitors,  the  first  few 
elections  become crucial,  according to  Zielinski  (2002:  185): 
“Indeed, they are the founding moments when political actors 
determine which cleavages to depoliticize and which to establish 
9 A more complete review of the literature on cleavages in post-
communist Europe is provided by Whitefield (2002) and Enyedi (2006).
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as the permanent axes of political competition”. There is clearly 
too much voluntarism involved here, since the party system is 
unlikely to become institutionalized if it fails to represent salient 
divisions  in  the  electorate.  At  least  the  Latin  American 
experience shows that some party systems do not institutionalize 
even over several election cycles. Consequently, as long as the 
electoral system does not impede them, new parties may enter 
the system relatively easily. 
What is more, we should not confound the persistence of a set of 
parties  that  emerged  at  the  outset  of  democratic  party 
competition  with  that  of  the  underlying  cleavages  that  have 
brought the party system into being. Indeed, as discussed earlier 
on, parties in Western European have demonstrated a remarkable 
capacity to adapt to new conflicts. A number of authors therefore 
point to the continuing ability of elites to forge or dilute links 
between  themselves  and  specific  social  groups.  For  example, 
Enyedi  (2005)  analyzes  how the  Hungarian  Fidesz  party  has 
been able to profoundly modify its original ideological appeal as 
a  left-libertarian  party.  In  a  process  accompanied  by a  major 
realignment,  the  party merged  various  ideological  dimensions 
and  right-wing  segments  and  consolidated  a  new  divide  by 
creating impermeable  boundaries  between the two sides.  Two 
further  studies  show  that  parties  can  both  establish  and 
downplay  cleavages.  In  Spain,  the  left  originally  adopted  a 
catch-all  strategy after the transition to democracy,  and social 
class did not have an influence on the vote (Chhibber and Torcal 
1997). The adoption of a more redistributive profile in economic 
policy-making and the capacity to actually enact a number of its 
propositions in government then resulted in an anchoring of the 
party in terms of social class. In Chile, the left took the opposite 
route.  Because  the  regime  question  loomed  large  after  the 
transition  to  democracy,  the  left  de-emphasized  redistributive 
issues in order to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats, 
the other pro-democratic party. As a consequence, according to 
Torcal  and  Mainwaring’s  (2003)  analysis,  the  party  system’s 
roots in social class put in evidence before the coup vanished.
For an understanding of cleavages as long-term representations 
of social structural conflicts, the malleability of the social bases 
of  party  competition  poses  a  problem.  What  is  it,  then,  that 
anchors party systems durably in society? Tóka (1998) applies 
Knutsen  and  Scarbrough’s  (1995)  distinction  between  pure 
social structural voting, value voting, and cleavage voting (the 
latter encompassing both social structural and value voting, as 
discussed  earlier  on)  to  explain  individual-level  volatility  in 
voting  choices,  using  panel  data  from  Central  and  Eastern 
European  countries.  His  analysis  reveals  that  while  social 
structural characteristics alone do not stabilize party choice in 
any way,  value-based voting and organizational  encapsulation 
have the strongest stabilizing effect. This finding is actually in 
line with the party-system-based interpretation of the “freezing 
hypothesis” presented earlier on in this review: it seems that it is 
not the social structural roots per se, but rather antagonistically 
related  collective  identities  that  stabilize  party  systems.  The 
subcultures created by conflicts therefore constitute the durable 
basis of cleavages, and not their immutable social bases.
Conclusion
While there continues to be some disagreement over what may 
properly be termed a cleavage, its intuitive appeal, as noted by 
Tóka (1998), lies in the idea that some links between parties and 
voters  are  more  stable  than  others.  Especially with  regard  to 
divisions in new democracies, but also due to the transformation 
of cleavages in their Western European heartland, scholars have 
begun to question whether the requirement of clear-cut roots in 
social  structure  may not  be too demanding and unnecessarily 
narrows  down the applicability of  the  concept  (Enyedi  2005, 
2008).  One  of  the  reasons  why  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to 
identify the social roots of political conflicts is methodological, 
or  perhaps  conceptual:  our  categories  for  describing  social 
structure  often  lag  behind  our  understanding  of  the  conflicts 
themselves.  One  way  out  is  to  refine  our  terminology  with 
respect to various types of divisions, which more often than not 
may fall short of constituting a cleavage, as Bartolini (2005b) 
and  Deegan-Krause  (2006,  2007)  have  suggested.  The  other 
possibility, and indeed the one suggested by this review, is to put 
primary  emphasis  on  the  enduring  character  of  collective 
political  identifications  resulting  from  large-scale  societal 
transformations as the defining element of cleavages.
Especially when stated in the second way, the cleavage concept 
is useful not only with respect to Western Europe, but also to 
characterize  a  type  of  political  conflict  that  helps  in 
institutionalizing  party  systems.  Together  with  the  ensuing 
reduction of volatility, this installs mechanisms of accountability 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mair 1997, Tóka 1998: 591-2). 
Cleavage-like  conflicts  are  therefore  good  for  democracy and 
democratic  consolidation  rather  than  a  threat.  In  the  old 
democracies, the decline of cleavage-based voting and the fact 
that voters “began to choose” (Rose and McAllister 1986) first 
seemed to be welcomed by many observers, while the spectre of 
populism then led to more gloomy assessments of the state of 
democracy in  the  1990s.  While  their  outgrowths  are  perhaps 
unpleasant,  the  prospect  of  new value  conflicts  consolidating 
into cleavages in Western Europe may therefore be good, rather 
than bad, news for democratic accountability.
In any event, political agency has received the place it deserves 
in the recent literature on cleavages,  both in the old and new 
democracies  alike.  However,  neither  social  determinism  nor 
volontarist accounts of elite political behaviour help us to make 
sense  of  politics  and  its  long-term  evolution.  Recent 
developments in the literature help us to bridge the “bottom-up” 
and “top-down” approaches,  and thus have taken a promising 
direction.  In  Western  Europe,  the  programmatic  stances  of 
parties mobilizing along the traditional conflicts impinge on the 
long-term endurance of these conflicts, and their reactions to a 
changing social  structure  determine  if  and how new conflicts 
manifest themselves politically. In more recently democraticized 
contexts, on the other hand, we witness the initial formation of 
party  systems.  Path  dependency  has  a  central  place  in  the 
cleavage  account,  and  depending  on  the  divisions  that  are 
institutionalized in these countries, and the degree to which they 
can  oust  clientelism  as  the  predominant  mode  of  political 
mobilization,  different  prospects  for  democratic  consolidation 
and for the representation of interests emerge. 
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